Central secret storage
Vault, cloud key management or SOPS, chosen for your constraints, with namespacing and access policies that mirror how your teams are actually organised.
Security & Compliance
No credentials in Git, and nothing long-lived enough to be worth stealing.
The work
Most breaches we are called in for start with a credential somebody left somewhere convenient: a token in a config file, a database password in a private repository, a key pasted into a shared document. We find those, remove them, and build a path where the application fetches what it needs at runtime instead.
The work usually means HashiCorp Vault, a cloud key management service or SOPS depending on your size and where you run. We scope access by workload identity rather than by shared accounts, set rotation on the schedule your team can actually maintain, and add detection for secrets that escape into a repository or log.
Scope
Every engagement on this page covers the following, sized to your setup rather than delivered as a fixed package. If something here is not relevant to you, it comes off the scope and off the price.
Vault, cloud key management or SOPS, chosen for your constraints, with namespacing and access policies that mirror how your teams are actually organised.
Pods, functions and build agents authenticate with short-lived tokens from their platform identity, so no human has to hold a durable credential at all.
Rotation jobs for database passwords, API keys and certificates, scheduled with enough overlap that a running service never notices a rotation happening.
Repository and log scanning plus provider-side alerts, so a committed token is caught in minutes and revoked rather than discovered during an incident review.
A short, documented way for engineers to fetch what they need locally with a personal identity, audit logged and time limited, instead of copying values from a chat message.
An inventory of where credentials live today and a sequenced plan to move them, including the awkward ones embedded in legacy code you cannot change this quarter.
What changes
Handover
Everything produced during the engagement is yours: the repositories, the accounts, the documentation. There is no proprietary layer and nothing to unlicense if you take the work in-house.
Tooling
A starting point, not a requirement. We work in whatever you already run wherever it does the job.
How it runs
The same four steps on every engagement. You see each one before it starts and can stop at any of them.
A scan of repositories, CI configuration, container images and cloud accounts builds an inventory, so decisions are based on what is really there rather than on assumptions.
We agree on the backend, the naming scheme and who can read what, then write it down before any migration begins so the target is not invented mid-flight.
Applications move to short-lived credentials one at a time, each with a rollback path, starting with the ones that carry the most exposure and the least complexity.
Once live we run the rotation jobs for real, deliberately test the leak alarm, and hand your team the runbook for revoking a credential on a bad day.
Questions
AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault and Google Secret Manager are fine for many teams and we often start there. Vault earns its place when you need dynamic credentials, broad multi-cloud coverage or strict isolation, and we will tell you when that is not yet the case.
Removing the file is not enough, because the value sits in the git history and every clone ever made. We treat anything exposed as compromised, rotate it first, then rewrite history only where that is safe and worth the disruption.
It can, if an app caches a credential at startup and never re-reads it. We test rotation in staging with the same overlap logic used in production, and where an application genuinely cannot handle it we document that limit rather than pretending otherwise.
Developers get short-lived credentials tied to their own identity, usually through a CLI login or a token broker, so no shared development password exists. That also gives you an audit trail showing which person read which secret and when.
Security & Compliance
Security checks wired into the pipeline, so vulnerabilities are caught in review instead of in production.
Least-privilege access that's provable, reviewed and revoked automatically when someone changes teams.
Guardrails expressed as code, enforced before deployment — not a wiki page nobody reads.
Bring the specific problem. We will tell you honestly whether this is the service that fixes it, and what it would take.